sábado, 15 de diciembre de 2012

Procedimiento penal colombiano para no abogados


Este documento resume el procedimiento penal actualmente vigente en Colombia bajo la Ley 906 de 2004 (Código de Procedimiento Penal). Su propósito es servir como guía fácil a las personas que sin tener conocimientos o estudios jurídicos profesionales, tengan particular interés en la comprensión de las fases y rasgos fundamentales del procedimiento penal vigente, bien sea porque se están iniciando en el estudio del derecho penal o porque alguna situación personal indeseable así se los exige.

Para mayor facilidad en su lectura, el documento se divide en las siguientes partes: (i) noticia criminal y apertura de indagación, (ii) investigación de la conducta delictiva, (iii) fase intermedia, y (iv) juicio.

Es importante anotar desde ya, que a lo largo de toda la investigación y el proceso penal el acusado disfruta de la presunción de inocencia, por mandato constitucional. Sólo hasta el momento final, en que la sentencia condenatoria ha quedado en firme (es decir, cuando no queda ningún recurso judicial por agotar) la presunción de inocencia deja de aplicar.

1.         Noticia criminal y apertura de indagación

Cualquier proceso penal tiene un objetivo primordial: determinar si un individuo perpetró una conducta considerada como delictiva por la ley penal. Así las cosas, el punto de partida de cualquier proceso penal consiste en la apertura de una indagación con base en una “noticia criminal” de la que ha tenido conocimiento la autoridad competente (esto es cualquier funcionario con funciones de policía judicial (como aquellos pertenecientes al CTI de la Fiscalía General de la Nación, la Policía Fiscal y Aduanera o la Procuraduría, entre otras entidades)) (artículo 202 - Ley 906 de 2004), bien sea por la denuncia de un particular, petición especial, querella o por conocimiento propio. La noticia criminal está conformada por la descripción de los hechos, circunstancias y presuntos responsables, que es puesta en conocimiento de las autoridades competentes, y que origina el inicio de la fase de indagación del proceso penal.

El objetivo de la fase de indagación es permitirle al Fiscal determinar con claridad la efectiva configuración de una conducta punible, así como los responsables, perpetradores, copartícipes o determinadores de la misma.  Puede terminar de tres formas. La primera es el archivo de la indagación ,en caso de que el Fiscal considere que no se configuró un delito o no pueda hallar a los responsables  del mismo. La segunda es el archivo por prescripción de la acción penal, en caso de que pase el tiempo que la ley determina para la procedencia de la prescripción. La tercera es la formulación de la imputación por parte del Fiscal ante un Juez de Control de Garantías, en cuyo caso se inicia la  Fase Intermedia que se describe más adelante.

La fase de indagación tiene un término de duración indefinido, ya que la ley no estipuló ningún límite para su duración, a excepción de los términos de prescripción para el ejercicio de la acción penal, los cuales son equivalentes al máximo monto de la pena permitida para el delito investigado. Así, por ejemplo, si el Código Penal estipula que un delito tendrá una pena de 5 a 8 años de cárcel, el delito prescribirá una vez trascurran 8 años sin que el Fiscal haya formulada una imputación (art. 83 del Código Penal – Ley 599 de 2000).

2.         Investigación de la conducta delictiva

La fase de investigación en sentido estricto inicia con la formulación de la imputación (la cual se explica a mayor detalle en el punto 3.1 siguiente) y se prolonga hasta el momento de radicación del escrito de formulación de acusación ante el Juez de Conocimiento, es decir, ante el Juez que finalmente debe decidir sobre la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado.

Es importante aclarar acá que eso no significa que a lo largo de la fase de Juicio, el cual se explicará más adelante, no sea posible seguir investigando aspectos relevantes para el caso. Durante la etapa de Juicio es posible recaudar de manera excepcional nuevos elementos materiales probatorios, evidencia física o información relevante para el proceso (Artículo 344 - Ley 906 de 2004. "(...) si durante el juicio alguna de las partes encuentra un elemento material probatorio y evidencia física muy significativos que debería ser descubierto, lo pondrá en conocimiento del juez quien, oídas las partes y considerado el perjuicio que podría producirse al derecho de defensa y la integridad del juicio, decidirá si es excepcionalmente admisible o si debe excluirse esa prueba").

Después de la audiencia de formulación de la imputación el fiscal acusador tiene solamente 30 días para hacer una de tres cosas: presentar un escrito de acusación, por el cual pide la condena del acusado; solicitar la preclusión de la investigación (es decir el archivo de la investigación) o aplicar el principio de oportunidad, el cual consiste en la renuncia a la acción penal sobre la base de un acuerdo con el acusado. La Corte Suprema de Justicia considera que esos 30 días deben ser entendidos como días calendario (y no hábiles) (Radicado 28288 de 6 de septiembre de 2007).

Si trascurren los 30 días sin que el Fiscal haya tomado ninguna determinación, perderá competencia sobre el caso y será remplazado por otro Fiscal que también tendrá 30 días para tomar la decisión procedente. Si aún así la Fiscalía no presenta escrito de acusación, se configura una causal para precluir la investigación. Si la persona acusada está detenida, procede su libertad de forma automática.  

3.         Fase intermedia (Audiencias preliminares)

3.1.        Formulación de imputación

Una vez el Fiscal que ha concluido su indagación preliminar, llegando a la conclusión de que  la conducta delictiva en efecto se llevó a cabo y descubriendo quién es el responsable de la conducta, dicho funcionario solicita un audiencia ante un Juez de Control de Garantías conocida como Audiencia de Formulación de la Imputación, la cual, como ya se explicó, da inicio a la fase de investigación en sentido estricto.

La audiencia de formulación de imputación tiene dos fines principales y no debe ser confundida con la audiencia de Juicio. La audiencia de formulación de imputación busca que (i) el Fiscal le diga al Juez de Control de Garantías las razones por las que el presunto autor del delito debe ser llevado a un Juicio penal, en el cual se determine con base en todas las pruebas que en él puedan practicarse, su culpabilidad o inocencia, y que (ii) el presunto responsable sepa de qué se le acusa, por cuáles cargos y por qué razones, para que pueda defenderse.

3.2.        Formulación de la Acusación

Después de la audiencia de formulación de la imputación, y antes del vencimiento del término de los 30 días arriba mencionados, el Fiscal debe radicar un escrito de acusación en una audiencia oral, conocida como Audiencia de formulación de la Acusación, la cual tiene lugar ante el Juez de Conocimiento, es decir, ante el Juez que finalmente va a decidir sobre la inocencia o culpabilidad del acusado después de que se haya surtido el Juicio oral.

La radicación de ese escrito de acusación marca el fin de la etapa de investigación y da inicio a una fase intermedia entre aquella y la fase de Juicio, el cual se explicará más adelante. La audiencia de formulación de la acusación tiene como fin primordial la delimitación de los puntos que serán debatidos en el Juicio, así como determinar los elementos que podrán practicarse como pruebas en dicha fase.[1]  (Sentencia C-1194 de 2005. Corte Constitucional. M.P. Marco Gerardo Monroy)

3.3.        Audiencia Preparatoria

Una vez formulada la Acusación por parte del Fiscal ante el Juez de Conocimiento (es decir, el juez que finalmente decidirá sobre la inocencia o culpabilidad del acusado), se surte la Audiencia Preparatoria, la cual tiene por objeto que las partes le informen al Juez de Conocimiento cuáles serán las pruebas que pretender hacer valer en el Juicio. Así, las partes señalan su intención de que en la fase probatoria del Juicio sea llamada a declarar X o Y persona en calidad de testigo o perito, o que sean admitidas ciertas evidencias probatorias.

En esta fase, cada una de las partes tiene la posibilidad de oponerse a las pretensiones de su contraparte de incluir una u otra prueba al Juicio, por considerar que las pruebas no son conducentes o pertinentes, o que están viciadas de nulidad, como por ejemplo en los casos en que las pruebas que pretender hacer valer una de las partes fueron recaudadas ilegalmente por medio de interceptaciones telefónicas que no fueron autorizadas por un Juez de Control de Garantías.

4.         Juicio

Con posterioridad a la Audiencia Preparatoria, empieza la fase de Juicio. Las fase de Juico se compone de cuatro partes: alegatos de apertura, fase probatoria, alegatos de conclusión y sentencia. Agregamos una quinta parte, consistente en los recursos que pueden interponerse contra la sentencia.

A continuación se hará una breve explicación de cada fase.

4.1.    Alegatos de apertura

El Juicio inicia con la presentación de la teoría del caso que hacen los distintos intervinientes (fiscalía y defensa), en la cual explican su interpretación de los hechos, su visión sobre la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado, y en la cual exponen lo que intentarán probar a lo largo del Juicio con base en las pruebas que serán aportadas al mismo.

4.2.    Fase probatoria

Una vez concluidos los alegatos de apertura, inicia la fase de presentación de pruebas, en la cual las partes presentan sus testigos e introducen la evidencia probatoria que esperan usar en la demostración de la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado, según sea el caso. A lo largo de esta fase es común que las partes llamen a declarar testigos o peritos (es decir expertos en ciertas materias, como por ejemplo expertos contadores, grafólogos, psiquiatras, etc.) y que realicen contrainterrogatorios en contra de los testigos de su contraparte, con el fin de desacreditarlos y quitarles credibilidad. Esta es la fase más importante de todo el proceso antes de la sentencia, ya que los jueces deben motivar sus decisiones con base únicamente en lo que haya sido presentado como prueba en el Juicio.

4.3.    Alegatos de conclusión

Después de la fase probatoria, los principales intervinientes hacen sus alegatos de conclusión ante el Juez de Conocimiento, haciendo un resumen de todas las pruebas que fueron presentadas en el Juicio, haciendo una valoración de las mismas y sugiriendo la interpretación de los hechos que convenga a sus intereses, buscando siempre la condena o absolución del acusado, dependiente de la parte que hable. Lógicamente, la Fiscalía buscará la condena del acusado, mientras que la defensa buscará su absolución. En esta fase, así como en la fase probatoria, participan también un delegado de la Procuraduría y un representante de las víctimas, quienes también pueden expresar sus argumentos y conclusiones.

4.4.    Sentencia

Una vez terminadas las intervenciones de las parte, el Juez de Conocimiento tiene la función de evaluar las pruebas introducidas al proceso, así como los alegatos de las partes, y proferir una sentencia  motivada, en la cual se absuelva o condene al acusado, determinando el monto de la pena en caso de que el acusado sea hallado responsable.

4.5.    Recursos

Frente a la sentencia de absolución o condena las partes pueden interponer recursos, bien sea de reposición, el cual se tramita por el mismo Juez de Conocimiento que profirió la sentencia, o de apelación, ante un Juez o Tribunal de mayor jerarquía. En ambos casos, el Juez o Tribunal ante el que se interpone el recurso puede confirmar o revocar la decisión inicial.

Nota: Para mayor información, puede escribir a camiloencisov@yahoo.com o comunicarse al celular 318-7268740. 

sábado, 30 de junio de 2012

A Defiant Approach to the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege Principle


11 de noviembre de 2009

Introduction

The claim defended in this essay is that the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the “ICC”) has at its disposal persuasive arguments for prosecuting and sentencing persons tried under the charge of Aggression of article 5 of the Rome Statute (hereinafter “RS”), without regard to (a) the provision of paragraph 2, of article 5 (hereinafter “5(2)”) of the RS, and (b) to the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle, consecrated under article 22. Using such arguments should not be seen as a violation of the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle, but rather, as an amendment of such principle, under International Criminal Law common practices.

I

Human rights advocates around the world have raised throughout the last decades the argument that high public officers are liable before the International Criminal Court for perpetrating crimes of Aggression, without regard to the existence or not of a definition of such crime under the rules of the RS. Those persons have not been successful in giving a satisfactory answer as to the reasons that would grant the ICC with such jurisdiction in such cases different from the procedure of articles 121 and 123, nor to the possibility of convicting such persons without violating the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle.

The contention of this paper is that the ICC needs not wait until the States comply with the procedures described under articles 121 and 123 of the RS, which should apply as provided under 5(2). Plus, it is hereby affirmed that under the present circumstances of evolution of (a) the RS, (b) International Public Law, and (c) the evolution of the ICC as a “normative force”, such tribunal could make a broad interpretation of the RS, assuming the competency in such cases, and sentencing the persons tried in them, in contradiction with the usual practice of civil and common law worldwide.

II

The difficulties derived from the application (or non application) of the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle for the enforcement, prosecution and punishment of crimes, under western – common or civil – law are well known. The defendants and defense attorneys in the cases tried by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals insisted fiercely in the impossibility of prosecuting and convicting someone for a crime which had not been enacted prior to its execution.[1]

Further, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”), confronted the same problem, plus the additional difficulty derived from the existence and application of the sibling principle of the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle, namely, the Nullum Poena, Sine Lege Stricta et Previa.[2]

The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, however, used the general argument that it could not be possible to acquit the defendants under the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle, because that would equal to accept that the defendants ignored the “wrong” implicit in their actions. This trickery, however, has been strongly criticized by the positivist school of thought.[3] The arguments used by the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals, however, have been used also by the ICTY and the ICTR in their decisions, thus giving a step forward toward the birth of a universal practice of international criminal law, based to a certain extent on natural law.

The two main positions deriving from this debate evince the difficulties which the ICC would have to overcome, pursuant to the crime of Aggression. The competence of the ICC to judge cases involving the crime of Aggression depends, pursuant to 5(2), on the approval of the States of a definition of the crime, and on their approval of the elements of the crime.

My argument is that the ICC under a strict interpretation of the RS would surely need to wait until the approval of the States abovementioned. There are arguments enough, however, to assess that it could rule cases related to such crimes in any moment. The basis for this idea is that the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege principle was intended originally, to impede arbitrary prosecutions, violations of due process, and unfair and unjust convictions for conducts not previously considered as crimes by a particular sovereign, but the concept of Aggression and its elements is well known by the international community several decades ago. Thus, the mere enunciation of article 5 of the jurisdiction of the ICC on crimes of Aggression should be sufficient to deter persons to commit such crime, pursuant to what I could call the hard core of Aggression.

The concept of Aggression was included in several provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, such as articles 1 and 39.[4] Plus, the hard core of Aggression as a conduct which would violate International Public Law was included under Resolution 3314 of the United Nations, issued in 1974. [5]

In addition to the abovementioned, the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (hereinafter “SWGCA”) which was created since 2002, has been drafting the Elements of the crime of Aggression ever since, trying to take participating parties to approve the draft submitted for the review of the group since 2002.[6]

Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive difficulties that have been raised by different State members of the working group, it is feasible to say that the definition of the crime of Aggression proposed and provisionally agreed by the parties is substantively equal to the definition of Aggression contained under Resolution 3314. Thus, the normative value of the negotiations, pursuant to Resolution 3314, article 5 of the RS, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and the legacy of the last decades of International Public and Criminal Law, implies that the ICC could interpret that the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege, is relative to the feasibility that a specific State had to acknowledge that the action that was being committed violated the provision of article 5 of the Rome Statute.

This is very important, taking into account the obstructive practices in which States are incurring in order to delay the enforceability of the crime of Aggression over its public officers. The obvious question that could be raised here is: Could someone be charged and convicted by the ICC, notwithstanding the fact that the crime has not been yet defined? And my answer would be “Yes, as the hard core elements of the relevant conduct have already been defined in several treaties, declarations, and agreements, agreed upon by the member states”. This answer can also be supported under two additional arguments.

First, I affirm that the RS and the crime of Aggression need to be looked under the scope of the Pacta Sunt Servanda principle and International Public Law[7]. By signing the RS, States have complied to surrender to the jurisdiction of the ICC and to make its best efforts to contribute in defining the crimes of article 5. Doing counter wise would be against International Public Law, and would be grave evidence that the State is intending not to admit the jurisdiction of the ICC for crimes of Aggression.

Second, the customary practice of international war and crime tribunals is to admit a certain relativity of the Nullum Crimen, Sine Lege Previa, provided that the crime perpetrated is so obvious to be a crime, that no Lege Previa would be needed to prove the obvious. That practice, even though questionable from a positivist standpoint, has a very strong normative power pursuant to peace stability and in connection to atrocities and crimes which may trigger war between States.

If we take a glance to the Elements of the crime of Aggression submitted for the discussion of the Working Group[8], it is apparent that it is simply a repetition of the elements contained under Resolution 3314. Thus, high public officers could not justifiably, from a criminal standpoint, perpetrate a crime of Aggression, as they already knew the normative content of the crime of Aggression.

In support of this idea, the ICC could also invoke article 18 of the Vienna Convention: “Pursuant to article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, States are obliged not to defeat the purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force”.[9] The lack of use of the crime of Aggression, under the Nulla Poena, Sine Lege argument, thus would depart from an interpretation that would contradict the basis of a very strongly developed tradition of International Public Law.

Finally, the ICC could argue that its competency is derived directly from the axiological function of the crime of Aggression pursuant to the fulfillment of the function of United Nations and the ICC, as organizations whose main aim is the safeguard of peace and human rights. This interpretation would be feasible under article 21 of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, this argument is plausible under the consideration that the Charter is the constitutional framework of the International Community, and that the legal instruments which derive from it shall be interpreted in furtherance of the goals and aims of the former.

III

While I am aware of the enormous task that implies defending in a coherent and solid manner the thesis fostered under this essay I believe that I have portrayed some interesting elements that would allow an extension of the competency of the ICC to cases of Aggression, without the need of further steps by sovereign national States, which, under my point of view, are not really committed to the adoption of a definition of such crime, whereas it attempts against the idea of sovereignty and of impunity for crimes of Aggression.

BIBILIOGRAPHY

ENDO, Guillaume. Nullum Crimen, Nullum Poena Sine Lege. Principle and the ICTY and ICTR. P. 206.SCHABAS, William A. Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 2000. 11EJIL 522.HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Clarendon Law Series. 1997.Report of the SWGCA, dated 20 February 2009 (ICCASP/7/SWGCA/2)WILMSHURST, Elizabeth. Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House,Professor of International Law at University College London, United Kingdom. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/da/da.htmlCharter of the United Nations. 1945.Rome Statute.Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute.Resolution 3314 of the United Nations. 1974.http://books.google.com/books?id=SPhGSg_5Go0C&pg=PA283&lpg=PA283&dq=Perverse+Effects+of+Nulla+Poena+Principle&source=bl&ots=rFXmR_8lvA&sig=WqfC-i9-IZYIqkt0CH5x1UhOn08&hl=en&ei=WbzSSq6QCtC0lAfUzaWKAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=Perverse%20Effects%20of%20Nulla%20Poena%20Principle&f=false[1] ENDO, Guillaume. Nullum Crimen, Nullum Poena Sine Lege. Principle and the ICTY and ICTR. P. 206.[2] SCHABAS, William A. Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 2000. 11EJIL 522.[3] HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Clarendon Law Series. 1997.[4] Charter of the United Nations. Article 1. The Purposes of the United National are: 1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace (…) Article 39. “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.[5] Resolution 3314 of the United Nations. Articles 3 and 4. “Article 1. Aggression is the use of force by one State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition.(…) Article 3. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: (…) b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State.Article 5. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.(…)”
[6] Paragraph 42 of the Report of the SWGCA, dated 20 February 2009 (ICCASP/7/SWGCA/2)[7]WILMSHURST, Elizabeth. Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House,Professor of International Law at University College London, United Kingdom. “The Definition has rarely if ever been used for that purpose. It has however been referred to by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its consideration of unlawful use of force by States. The ICJ has decided that the provision in article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition reflects customary international law (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)”http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/da/da.html
[8] “Elements. 1: The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which committed an act of aggression as defined in element 5 of these Elements. 2: The perpetrator was knowingly in that position. 3: The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the planning, preparation or execution of the act of aggression. 4: The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and knowledge. 5: An “act of aggression”, that is to say, an act referred to in United Nations. General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, was committed by a State.6: The perpetrator knew that the actions of the State amounted to an act of aggression. 7: The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 8: The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect to element 7.”[9] http://books.google.com/books?id=SPhGSg_5Go0C&pg=PA283&lpg=PA283&dq=Perverse+Effects+of+Nulla+Poena+Principle&source=bl&ots=rFXmR_8lvA&sig=WqfC-i9-IZYIqkt0CH5x1UhOn08&hl=en&ei=WbzSSq6QCtC0lAfUzaWKAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CDUQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=Perverse%20Effects%20of%20Nulla%20Poena%20Principle&f=false

sábado, 17 de marzo de 2012

Reflexiones sobre la reforma a la justicia

En su columna del 17 de marzo de 2012 Paloma Valencia publicó en el diario El País una interesante columna en la que realiza una serie de reflexiones sobre la reforma a la justicia en curso en Colombia.[1]

A continuación comparto mis observaciones sobre dicha columna:

1.       Catalogar lo que hizo Uribe con los paramilitares como victoria es una exageración. No hubo victoria. Hubo un acuerdo de impunidad que buscaba llevar a los paramilitares al Congreso. Sólo gracias a una sentencia de la Corte Constitucional se logró atajar ese exabrupto. Los (ex) paramilitares, al igual que los guerrilleros de las FARC, el ELN y sus aliados, siguen delinquiendo por doquier. Sólo algunos están presos o extraditados. Los demás están reencauchados en Bacrim o fueron acogidos por las estructuras delincuenciales de las FARC o el ELN.

2.       No es correcto decir que los juicios contra los parapolíticos sólo se iniciaron gracias a la desmovilización de los paramilitares. Estudios como el de Claudia López desenmascararon el atroz concubinato y concierto para delinquir acordado entre una inmensa mayoría de la bancada parlamentaria uribista y los paramilitares.  Los juicios hubieran ocurrido de todos modos. Y me parece muy cuestionable asumir (o insinuar) que en la Corte Suprema de Justicia ("CSJ") no se habían iniciado esos procesos por miedo. No podemos olvidar que los procesos se iniciaron cuando Uribe estaba en el poder (y Uribe tenía en ese momento mucho más poder – y era mucho más temible – que cualquier paramilitar,  parapolítico o guerrillero).

3.       Decir que no hay investigaciones de Farcpolítica porque esa estructura está activa es un argumento falso y falaz, por donde se lo mire. La CSJ sí ha adelantado investigaciones por Farcpolítica. El hecho de que no haya condenas se puede deber a muchas razones: falta de mayor número de denuncias, inexistencia generalizada del delito al nivel de Congreso (muy por el contrario de la parapolítica), falta de pruebas, falta de competencia de quien recolecta las pruebas o problemas en la cadena de custodia (e.g. de los computadores de Reyes).

4.       La relación jueces por número de habitante no dice mayor cosa. Este es también uno
de los países con mayor criminalidad del mundo.

5.       En la conclusión estoy de acuerdo. Debe haber una separación radical entre las funciones de investigación y juzgamiento. No se nos olvide, sin embargo, decir que quien creó esa estructura fue la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, no los magistrados de las cortes. Una alternativa interesante sería que al Fiscal General de la Nación ("FGN") lo nombraran los magistrados de la Corte Constitucional de terna presentada por el Consejo de Estado.

6.       No creo que el FGN deba ser elegido por el Presidente de la República (aunque la columna no lo sugiere), como ocurre en los Estados Unidos. El poder casi ilimitado del Presidente de la República (porque en Colombia es el Presidente el que tiene un poder casi ilimitado, no las cortes, como sugiere la columna), no debe incrementarse todavía más.
7.       Estoy de acuerdo en que el derecho a la doble instancia debe establecerse como una garantía para cualquiera. Es inaceptable que las decisiones de un juez no puedan ser apeladas, así el juez sea la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

8.       Lo anterior debe complementarse con algo de lo que nadie ha hablado hasta el momento: en Colombia el sistema judicial está diseñado de forma tal que el reo puede ser absuelto en primera instancia, pero condenado en segunda instancia.

Esa decisión condenatoria de segunda instancia, en nuestro sistema, no puede ser apelada. Considero que esa situación es una clara violación de los derechos humanos y del derecho a la segunda instancia por una razón obvia: quien fue absuelto en primera instancia, pero condenado en segunda instancia, no tiene la oportunidad de impugnar las razones por las que fue condenado. Sólo le queda recurrir a la demanda de casación, lo cual no es un remedio efectivo, porque la técnica de casación en Colombia es un filtro demasiado duro que únicamente procede en algunos casos brutalmente limitados por la jurisprudencia de la CSJ. 

Una alternativa es que las sentencias absolutorias de primera instancia no puedan ser apeladas por la Fiscalía. Otra alternativa es que las sentencias condenatorias de segunda instancia puedan ser conocidas en apelación por magistrados de un tribunal de mayor jerarquía. Si el tribunal competente en ese caso fuese la CSJ, debería conocer la apelación un grupo de tres magistrados de la Sala Penal, y el resto de magistrados (que no conocieron la apelación), podrían quedar disponibles para conocer la demanda de casación, en caso de que el reo la presentase en una etapa posterior del proceso.

9.       Lo anterior no ocurre en el sistema anglosajón debido a que allá las decisiones condenatorias o absolutorias son proferidas por un jurado de conciencia conformado por ciudadanos, el cual toma decisiones de forma unánime, y dicho juicio es inapelable: Vox populi vox dei.  Lo que se apela en esos casos tiene relación con vicios del procedimiento a lo largo del juicio o con los errores en que el juez haya incurrido al dar instrucciones (sobre cómo decidir) al jurado de conciencia.

10.   Finalmente, en lo más importante estoy de acuerdo con la columnista: la reforma a la justicia es vital para fortalecer y proteger al Estado de Derecho y equilibrio de poderes. De la existencia de ese equilibrio depende la supervivencia de nuestra frágil democracia. Ojalá que en el futuro la columnista sea tan vehemente con gobiernos que amenazan el equilibrio institucional y la república, tal como hoy lo es con su reflexión sobre la Corte Suprema de Justicia.



miércoles, 11 de enero de 2012

Ransom Payments and State of Necessity under Colombia Law


This document provides my opinion on the following matter: is it lawful for an individual or company to pay a ransom for the release of a person abducted by a terrorist organization?

I hereby conclude that under Colombian regulations it is lawful to pay such a ransom, provided that the payer acts with the precise intention of protecting the abducted person´s life and integrity.

This document is structured as follows: (1) Regulations under the Colombian Criminal Code, (2) Rulings of the Constitutional Court, (3) Current Political Landscape, and (4) Conclusions.

1.          Regulations under the Colombian Criminal Code


1.1.1. Provision of Funds to Terrorists

The Colombian Criminal Code – Law 599 of 2000 – regulates the crime of Provision of Funds to Terrorists in Article 345[1]. Individuals engaged in that criminal activity shall be punished to imprisonment for 13 to 22 years.

Article 345 states:

“Art. 345. Provision of Funds to Terrorists and Management of Assets Related to Terrorist Activities (Article modified by Article 16 of Law 1121 of 2006. The new text reads as follows). Any person who directly or indirectly provides, collects, gives, receives, manages, grants, custodies or keeps funds, goods or assets, or who performs any other act that furthers, organizes, supports, maintains, finances or sustains financially illegal armed groups or its members, or national or international terrorist organizations, or terrorist activities, shall incur in prison for thirteen (13) to twenty two (22) years and shall be fined for one thousand three hundred  (1,300) to fifteen thousand (15,000) minimum monthly wages.”

As it is apparent, transferring assets or money to illegal organizations is a way of fostering such organization´s criminal activity. Therefore, in furtherance of Article 345 of the Criminal Code Colombian authorities could find an individual or corporation that has transferred money to an illegal organization liable for the crime of Provision of Funds to Terrorists.

Moreover, Article 30 of the Criminal Code determines that any person who contributes to the commission of an illegal conduct or provides aid after the crime has been committed, acting in furtherance of an agreement, shall be held criminally liable.[2] This means that corporate directors, family members, or risk management corporations involved with a transaction whereby an individual or a company gives money to a terrorist organization (such as FARC or ELN), could be found criminally liable under Article 345 of the Criminal Code.

However, as it will be explained below in Chapter 1.2.1 the transfer of assets in furtherance of the payment of ransoms, is deemed to be a lawful conduct, provided that the motivation of such conduct is the protection of the abducted person´s life and integrity.

1.1.2. Ransom Negotiations

Article 12 of the Criminal Code regulates the crime of Unlawful Execution of Insurance Agreements, as follows: 

“Article 12. Unlawful Execution of Insurance Agreements. (The Constitutional Court held this Article is conditionally constitutional)[3] The individual involved in the execution of an agreement which purpose is the payment of a ransom, or in the negotiation or mediation of the ransom, shall incur in prison for one (1) to two (2) years.”[4]

According to the above, the involvement of an individual in the negotiation or execution of a contract or agreement which purpose it the payment of a ransom is deemed to be a criminal conduct under Colombian law.

According to the language used in the quoted rule it is irrelevant whether the individual acts as an agent of the victim or in his interest, or as an agent of the victimizer or in his interest.

Therefore, the involvement or negotiation of a ransom on behalf, representation or in the interest of an abducted individual is, first hand, deemed to be a criminal conduct.

However, as it will be explained below in Chapter 1.2.1 the involvement, negotiation or execution of agreements in furtherance of the payment of ransoms, are deemed to be lawful conducts, provided that the motivation of such conducts is the protection of an abducted person´s life and integrity.

1.1.3. Sanctions to Domestic and Foreign Corporations

Article 25 of Law 40, 1993, punishes directors, officials or agents of corporations involved with the concealment or payment of ransoms, as follows:

 “Article 25. Sanctions to Domestic or Foreign Corporations (The Constitutional Court held this Article is conditionally constitutional)[5]. If a director of a domestic or foreign corporation or his agent conceals or aids the payment of a ransom to further the release of an official or employee of said corporation or of its subsidiaries, government will be entitled to terminate unilaterally the contracts executed by such corporation with public entities.

If the conduct is committed by an official or agent of a subcontractor of the corporation referred to above, government will order the subcontractor´s immediate removal of the country, provided that the subcontractor is a foreign corporation. Domestic subcontractors will be punished with the sanctions regulated by this law. (…)”[6]

According to the above, the concealment or payment of a ransom by a director of a domestic or foreign corporation or by his agent shall cause the unilateral termination of contracts entered into by the corporation and the Colombian state. Subcontractors that do not have a direct contractual relationship with the Colombian state may also be punished. The state will be allowed to expel the subcontractor from the country. It is unclear, however, the proceeding that should be applied by the Colombian government to impose such sanction. For this reason, we believe that the sanction may not be imposed until Congress enacts a law regulating such proceeding.

Further, as it will be explained below in Chapter 1.2.1 the concealment or payment of ransoms, are deemed to be lawful conducts, provided that they are committed with the purpose of protecting an abducted person´s life and integrity.

1.2.     Absence of Criminal Liability

The Criminal Code regulates circumstances of “Absence of Liability” (Excuses and Justifications) for the commission of conducts that, in principle, would be deemed punishable.
Excuses show compassion. They assume that under certain circumstances persons may engage in criminal or unlawful conduct.

We hold here that two excuses are applicable in the hypothesis under scrutiny – ransom payments – provided that the payment(s) is (are) made with the sole intention to further the release of an abducted person. Below we elaborate on each of them: (i) Necessity, and (ii) Duress.

1.2.1. Necessity

Persons have the right to protect their rights or those of third parties when those rights are of equal or higher importance than those of others, provided that the protection cannot be made otherwise.

According to Article 32, Paragraph 7:

“Art. 32. Absence of Liability. There shall not be criminal liability in the following cases: (…) 7. When the person acts with the aim to protect itself or others of imminent danger –not avoidable otherwise – and such danger was not created intentionally or recklessly by said person, and such person does not have the legal duty to withstand such danger.”

In sum, necessity justifies criminal conducts in situations of conflict between two rights, in which the salvation of one requires the sacrifice of the other. The classical example is the shipwreck case: after the ship has sunk, three individuals survive in a boat. They remain afloat for several days, but begin to starve. Two of the individuals decide to kill the third one with the aim of feeding themselves and safe their lives. After the “sacrifice” is committed, a rescue patrol finds the survivors. The survivors are tried in a criminal court for homicide, but are found not guilty, because they are justified by necessity.

This case is similar: As explained above (i) Article 345 regulates the crime of Provision of Funds to Terrorists, (ii) Article 12 regulates the crime of Unlawful Execution of Insurance Agreements, and (iii) Article 25 regulates the Sanctions to Domestic or Foreign Corporations.

Those provisions intend to deter the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations – payment from which those organizations fund their illegal activities and terrorist actions. However, if the payment, negotiation or transfer of assets to the criminal organization is made by necessity to protect an abducted person´s life, the individual that makes the payment cannot be held criminally liable, because he is justified by the law.

If an individual has been abducted by a terrorist organization – such as FARC – it can be argued that that person´s life and integrity is in imminent danger. Moreover, in many cases the reaction of the Colombian state to rescue the kidnapped individual is ineffective, which makes the necessity of payment the only way to avoid the imminent danger of death or harm. Last, in a case where the individual did not create a risk or put himself at reckless risk, necessity is deemed to be a complete excuse.

In sum, necessity is a complete excuse to transfer assets to a terrorist group, provided that the payer acts with the sole intention of obtaining the release of the abducted individual.

1.2.2. Duress

Necessity and duress are closely intertwined excuses of criminal liability under Colombian law. Necessity and duress differ in that necessity can involve natural occurrences that force a person to commit a certain act while duress implies a situation created by another that forces a person to commit a certain act.

However, duress is a form of necessity present in cases where an individual commits a crime under external force, violence or threat of violence in detriment of a third party, in order to save his or others rights of equal or higher interest.

According to Article 32, Paragraph 8:

“Art. 32. Absence of Liability. There shall not be criminal liability in the following cases: (…) 8. If the individual acts under duress.”[7]

If the terrorist group that keeps detained an abducted individual contacts his family members or his employer requiring the payment of a ransom, extortion will occur and the use of violence against the abducted individuals in case of withholding the payment can be deemed as imminent and unavoidable otherwise.

In the landmark Erdemovic case the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Crimes in Yugoslavia held about duress: 

“Law is based on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behavior which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behavior falling below those standards.”[8] (emphasis in original)

A just law should not demand supererogatory or unreasonable behavior from common persons. Individuals in these situations should be taken just as they commonly are – scared, vulnerable and emotional, instead of abstracted, cold and depersonalized rational agents. The idea of demanding a person to jeopardize the life of a loved one or of any other human being in the name of an intangible societal good is repugnant.[9]

Moreover, if the company or family members are contacted by a terrorist group, and such group demands the payment of a ransom, it may be assumed that such petition has a correlative threat to the life and integrity of the abducted individual, because (i) it is apparent that the release will not occur unless the payment is made, and (ii) the most likely outcome of non-payment is the execution or indefinite detention of the kidnapped subject.

Further, it is worth noting that in many cases the first demand of kidnappers to the victim´s family members or employers is not contact any authorities. That contact might put at additional danger the victim´s life and integrity. It seems cruel to demand from individuals to take such significant risk, particularly given the fact that ransom cases often occur precisely because there is a minimal chance of detection, or given the untrustworthiness of local police and security forces.[10]

1.2.3. Notice

The excuses described in 1.2.1. and 1.2.2. are not a complete safeguard against criminal charges being filed by the Attorney General´s Office for the commission of the criminal conducts described above in  1.1.1.,  1.1.2. and 1.2.3.

However, from their existence in the penal code it can be said that (i) the probability that the Attorney General´s Office indicts the negotiator or payer of the ransom is very low, and (ii) that even if the Attorney General´s Office indicts the negotiator or payer, the payer will have a very high probability of being acquitted by a criminal court.

Finally, it is noteworthy that a company or individual that intends to make a negotiation or ransom payment must avoid the execution of any type of broader agreement or contract that grants additional benefits to the company or individual entering into the agreement, particularly agreements whereby the victimizer agrees to withhold any kind of further aggression against the victim, his relatives or the company.
Escuchar
Leer fonéticamente

2.          Rulings of the Constitutional Court

The Colombian Constitution grants the Constitutional Court the competence to examine through judicial review the harmony between the Constitution of 1991 and laws enacted by Congress. In furtherance of that competence, the Court issued a judicial review sentence regarding Law 40 of 1993 – better known as Anti-Abduction Statute – which intended to deter the payment of ransoms by domestic and foreign corporations, as well as to prohibit the execution of abduction insurance agreements. Chapters 1.1.2. and 1.1.3. above elaborate in two articles of Law 40 of 1993.

The Constitutional Court concluded that Law 40 of 1993 was “conditionally constitutional”, which means that the law is constitutional only if interpreted and construed in certain specific form.

The Court concluded that no law could prohibit an individual from paying a ransom if the payment intends to protect other person's life; and further argued that necessity could be an excuse for paying a ransom in order to protect human dignity and life.

The tribunal held:

"The payment of the ransom is, in itself, a neutral act, nor good or bad. It is the goal pursued what defines its moral nature. (...) Whoever intervenes in making a payment under necessity as a mean to save its or other person's life or liberty, acts with an altruistic goal which is universally accepted. Whoever acts without necessity... with the purpose of ... providing funds to criminals, commits a crime."[11]

The Paragraph quoted above is a small example of the blurry line that divides what could be a payment protected under the Court's ruling, from a payment that could be cause of criminal liability. The main arguments of the Court were the following:

1.   The abduction´s victim confronts an imminent risk of losing its life, and has lost, at least temporally, its liberty.

2.     According to the Constitution and universal principles (of justice), human life and liberty are values which protection is mandatory for state and citizens. Therefore, any rule which intends to punish a reasonable conduct of individual oriented to protect life and liberty infringes the Constitution.

3.     Moreover, no rule can displace the justifications and excuses set forth by the law, necessity among them.

4.     The general interest argument in favor of the prohibition of payment is unpersuasive. Man is an end in itself and cannot be utilized as a means to reach the goals of society, unless man himself decides to admit that unjustified burden. Hence, the principle of prevalence of the general interest applicable in cases of clash between inferior rights is not applicable in this case.

5.     The state has the means to combat abduction; among them the investigation, prosecution and punishment of criminals. Thus, the state does not have the right to criminalize the victim or those who intend to defend her life and integrity in criminals.

6.   Article 12 of the Constitution prohibits cruel, degrading and inhumane treatments. Those treatments are imposed on the victim of an abduction and on his relatives when the law bans their option of using the only available means at their disposal (this is negotiating and paying a ransom), consequently aggravating the situation caused by the victimizers.

7.   The person that pays a ransom complies with the solidarity duty which Article 95 of the Constitution imposes on Colombian citizens: “Act according to the solidarity principle, performing humanitarian actions in situations that put at risk human´s life or health”.

Taking into account the arguments above presented, we hereby conclude that (i) the payment of ransoms is lawful under Colombian regulations, that (ii) the Constitutional Court´s opinion is compatible with the arguments presented here in 1.2.1., and therefore the Court agrees that necessity and duress are forms of excuse of the crimes described in Chapters 1.1.1., 1.1.2. and 1.1.3.

3.          Current Political Landscape

Abductions and extortions are the second source of funding of Colombian terrorist groups. After the nineteen nineties studies concluded that terrorist groups collected more than 1.5 billion dollars derived from such crimes during that decade. Those assets were invested in the purchase of weaponry, technical assistance, and deposited in banking accounts abroad, through complex money laundering operations.[12] That situation remains today.

As of March 10, 2011, President Juan Manual Santos delivered a speech warning multinational corporations operating in Colombia that they should avoid paying ransoms to illegal armed groups engaged in the abduction of their employees or officials, or they would be expelled from the country.[13]

President Santos emphasized:

“I hereby make a very clear warning: any company that pays one single cent to one of those criminals, will be expelled from the country”[14]

The President delivered the speech after listening the testimony of some of the 22 employees of South American Exploration – a contractor of the Canadian oil company Talisman – which had been abducted as of March 7 of 2011 and rescued one day after by the Colombian military. The employees stated that the guerrilla was seeking the payment of a 2.6 million dollars ransom.[15] According to President Santos, the company had already made an economic arrangement with the guerrilla, which could not be completed due to the forceful action of the Colombian military.

In the same speech President Santos added:

“We cannot allow anyone to “feed” those criminals, who will use that money to produce more violence and insecurity”[16]

Finally, the President stated that Colombian law prohibits and punishes the payment of ransoms. As it has been explained above, this is only partly true. After the Constitutional Court ´s ruling C-543 of 1993 analyzed above, any law punishing the payment of ransoms will be deemed unconstitutional.

However, President Santos´ speech shows the government´s attitude regarding ransom payments. It is apparent that the government is willing to push very hard in order to repress their payment and it is highly probable that it will take administrative action to punish and deter companies and individuals engaged in those payments.

4.          Conclusions

The negotiation and payment of ransoms is lawful under Colombian law and under ruling C-542 of 1993 of the Colombian Constitutional Court, provided that the negotiation or payment is made under necessity or duress, and with the sole intention to further the release of the abducted person´s life and integrity.

However, the current political landscape gives rise to additional legal and economic risks for a company or individual engaged with the negotiation or payment of such ransoms. The government has warned that companies engaged in such sort of negotiations or payments will be expelled from the country. While it is true that those assertions could be government propaganda aimed at deterring ransom payments, the depth and nature of that risk should be studied more closely.


[1] As modified by Article 16 of Law 1121 of 2006.
[2] Original text in Spanish: “ARTICULO 30. PARTICIPES. Son partícipes el determinador y el cómplice. Quien determine a otro a realizar la conducta antijurídica incurrirá en la pena prevista para la infracción.
Quien contribuya a la realización de la conducta antijurídica o preste una ayuda posterior, por concierto previo o concomitante a la misma, incurrirá en la pena prevista para la correspondiente infracción disminuida de una sexta parte a la mitad. Al interviniente que no teniendo las calidades especiales exigidas en el tipo penal concurra en su realización, se le rebajará la pena en una cuarta parte.” Law 599 of 2000.
[3] This means that the article is deemed to be constitutional only if interpreted in the way construed by the Colombian Constitutional Court in the constitutionality decision whereby the court examined whether the law was compliant with the Constitution or not.
[4] Original text in Spanish: “ARTÍCULO 12. CELEBRACIÓN INDEBIDA DE CONTRATOS DE SEGURO. <Artículo CONDICIONALMENTE EXEQUIBLE> Quien intervenga en la celebración de un contrato que asegure el pago del rescate de un posible secuestro o en la negociación o intermediación del rescate pedido por un secuestrado, incurrirá en prisión de uno (1) a dos (2) años.” Law 40 of 1993.
[5] This means that the article is deemed to be constitutional only if interpreted in the way construed by the Colombian Constitutional Court in the constitutionality decision whereby the court examined whether the law was compliant with the Constitution or not.
[6] Original text in Spanish: “ARTÍCULO 25. SANCIONES A EMPRESAS NACIONALES Y EXTRANJERAS.  <Artículo CONDICIONALMENTE EXEQUIBLE> Sin perjuicio de las demás sanciones a que hubiere lugar, cuando algún directivo de una empresa nacional o extranjera, o su delegado oculten o colaboren en el pago de la liberación de un secuestro de un funcionario o empleado de la misma, o de una de sus filiales, el Gobierno quedará facultado para decretar la caducidad de los contratos que esta empresa tenga suscritos con entidades estatales.
En caso de que el hecho sea cometido por un funcionario o delegado de un subcontratista de la anterior, si ésta es extranjera, el Gobierno ordenará su inmediata expulsión del país. Los subcontratistas nacionales serán objeto de las sanciones previstas en esta Ley. (…)” Law 40 of 1993.
[7] Original text in Spanish: “ARTICULO 32. AUSENCIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD. No habrá lugar a responsabilidad penal cuando: (…) 8. Se obre bajo insuperable coacción ajena.” Law 599 of 2000.
[8] ICTY, 1996b, Paragraph 46. In: http://www.unt.edu/honors/eaglefeather/2004_Issue/HensonC7.shtml June 27, 2011.
[10] Id.
[11] Constitutional Court. Decision 542 of November 24, 1993. Justice Jorge Arango Mejía.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.